Abstract. In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzerosum games of optimal stopping and certain 2-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.
Introduction
Connections between some problems of singular stochastic control (SSC) and questions of optimal stopping (OS) are well known in control theory. In 1966 Bather and Chernoff [5] studied the problem of controlling the motion of a spaceship which must reach a given target within a fixed period of time, and with minimal fuel consumption. This problem of aerospace engineering was modeled in [5] as a singular stochastic control problem, and an unexpected link with optimal stopping was observed. The value function of the control problem was indeed differentiable in the direction of the controlled state variable, and its derivative coincided with the value function of an optimal stopping problem.
The result of Bather and Chernoff was obtained by using mostly tools from analysis. Later on, Karatzas [26, 27] , and Karatzas and Shreve [28] employed fully probabilistic methods to perform a systematic study of the connection between SSC and OS for the so-called "monotone follower problem". The latter consists of tracking the motion of a stochastic process (a Brownian motion in [26] , [27] , [28] ) by a nondecreasing control process in order to maximise (minimise) a performance criterion which is concave (convex) in the control variable. Further, a link to optimal stopping was shown to hold also for monotone follower problems of finite-fuel type; i.e. where the total variation of the control (the fuel available to the controller) stays bounded (see [18] , [29] , and also [4] for dynamic stochastic finite-fuel). More recent works provided extensions of the above results to diffusive settings in [6] and [7] , to Brownian two-dimensional problems with state constraints in [11] , to Itô-Lévy dynamics under partial information in [36] , and to non-Markovian processes in [3] .
It was soon realised that these kinds of connections could be established in wider generality with admissible controls which are of bounded variation as functions of time (rather than just monotone). Indeed, under suitable regularity assumptions (including convexity or concavity of the objective functional with respect to the control variable) the value function of a bounded variation control problem is differentiable in the direction of the controlled state variable, and its derivative equals the value function of a 2-player zero-sum game of optimal stopping (Dynkin game). To the best of our knowledge, this link was noticed for the first time in [40] in a problem of controlling a Brownian motion, and then generalised in [8] and [31] , and later on also in [22] via optimal switching.
It is important to observe that despite their appearance in numerous settings, connections between SSC and OS are rather "delicate" and should not be given for granted, even for monotone follower problems with very simple diffusion processes. Indeed, counterexamples were recently found in [14] and [15] where the connection breaks down even if the cost function is arbitrarily smooth and the underlying processes are Ornstein-Uhlenbeck or Brownian motion.
The existing theory on the connection between SSC and OS is well established for single agent optimisation problems. However, the latter are not suitable for the description of more complex systems where strategic interactions between several decision makers play a role. Problems of this kind arise for instance in economics and finance when studying productive capacity expansion in an oligopoly [39] , the competition for the market-share control [32] , or the optimal control of an exchange rate by a central bank (see the introduction of the recent [24] for such an application).
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping (see [16] and references therein) and certain 2-player nonzero-sum games of singular stochastic control. These games involve two different underlying (one-dimensional) Itô-diffusions. The one featuring in the game of controls will be denoted by X, whereas the one featuring in the game of stopping will be denoted by X.
In the game of controls each player may exert a monotone control to adjust the trajectory of X. The first player can only increase the value of X, by exerting her control, while the second player can only decrease the value of X, by exerting her control. If player 1 uses a unit of control at time t > 0, then she must pay G 1 ( X t ), while at the same time player 2 receives L 2 ( X t ). A symmetric situation occurs if player 2 exerts control (see Section 2.2). Each player wants to maximise her own total expected reward functional.
In the game of stopping both players observe the dynamics of X and may decide to end the game, by choosing a stopping time for X. When the game ends, each player pays a cost according to the following rule: if the i-th player stops first, she pays G i ; if instead the i-th player lets the opponent stop first, she pays L i . Here G i and L i are the same functions as in the game of controls, and in general they depend on the value of X at the random time when the game is ended.
We show that if a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times of two separate thresholds, i.e. the process X is stopped as soon as it leaves an interval (a * , b * ) of the real line, then the couple of controls that keep X inside [a * , b * ] with minimal effort (i.e. according to a Skorokhod reflection policy) realises a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular controls. Moreover, we also prove that the value functions of the two players in the game of singular controls can be obtained by suitably integrating their respective ones in the game of optimal stopping. The existence of Nash equilibria of threshold type for the game of stopping holds in a large class of examples as it is demonstrated in the recent [16] . Here the proof of our main theorem (cf. Theorem 3.1 below) is based on a verification argument following an educated guess. In order to illustrate an application of our results we present a game of pollution control between a social planner and a firm representative of the productive sector.
Another important result of this paper is a simple explicit construction of Markov-perfect equilibria 1 for a class of 2-player continuous time stochastic games of singular control. This is a problem in game theory which has not been solved in full generality yet (see the discussion in Section 2 of [2] and in [39] ), and here we contribute to further improve results in that direction. We seek for Nash equilibria in the class of control strategies M which forbids the players to exert simultaneous impulsive controls (i.e. simultaneous jumps of their control variables). On the one hand, this is a convenient choice for technical reasons, but, on the other hand, we also show in Appendix A.1 that it induces no loss of generality in a large class of problems commonly addressed in the literature on singular stochastic control.
It is worth emphasising a key difficulty in handling nonzero-sum games. If, e.g., player 1 deviates unilaterally from an equilibrium strategy this has two effects: it worsens player 1's performance, but it also affects player 2's payoff. However it is impossible to establish a priori whether such a deviations benefit or harm player 2. This issue does not arise in single-agent problems and in two-player zero-sum games where the optimisation involves a unique objective functional. From a PDE point of view this is expressed by the fact that our nonzero-sum game of controls is associated to a system of coupled variational inequalities, rather than to a single variational inequality. Thus there is a fundamental difference between the nature of our results and the one of those already known for certain (single-agent) bounded variation control problems (see e.g. [8] , [40] ).
Our work marks a new step towards a global view on the connection between singular stochastic control problems and questions of optimal stopping by extending the existing results to nonzero-sum, multi-agent optimisation problems. A link between these two classes of optimisation problems is important not only from a purely theoretical point of view but also from a practical point of view. Indeed, as it was pointed out in [28] (cf. p. 857) one may hope to "jump" from one formulation to the other in order to "pose and solve more favourable problems". As an example, one may notice that questions of existence and uniqueness of optimisers are more tractable in control problems, than in stopping ones; on the other hand, a characterisation of optimal control strategies is in general a harder task than the one of optimal stopping rules. Recent contributions to the literature (e.g., [12] , [13] and [20] ) have already highlighted how the combined approach of singular stochastic control and optimal stopping is extremely useful to deal with investment/consumption problems for a single representative agent. It is therefore reasonable to expect that our work will increase the mathematical tractability of investment/consumption problems for multiple interacting agents.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the setting, the game of singular controls and the game of optimal stopping. In Section 3 we prove our main result and we discuss the assumptions needed. An application to a game of pollution control is considered in Section 4, whereas some proofs and a discussion regarding admissible strategies are collected in the appendix.
Setting

The underlying diffusions
Denote by (Ω, F, P) a complete probability space equipped with a filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 under usual hypotheses. Let W = ( W t ) t≥0 be a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion adapted to F, and ( X ν,ξ t ) t≥0 the strong solution (if it exists) to the one-dimensional, controlled stochastic
with I := (x, x) ⊆ R and with µ, σ real valued functions which we will specify below. Here (ν t ) t≥0 and (ξ t ) t≥0 belong to S := η : (η t (ω)) t≥0 left-continuous, adapted, increasing, with η 0 = 0, P-a.s.
and we denote
the first time the controlled process leaves I.
Notice that ν and ξ can be expressed as the sum of their continuous part and pure jump part, i.e.
where ∆ν s := ν s+ − ν s and ∆ξ s := ξ s+ − ξ s . Throughout the paper we will consider the process X ν,ξ killed at σ I , and we make the following assumptions on µ and σ.
Assumption 2.1. The functions µ and σ are in C 1 (I) and σ(x) > 0, x ∈ I.
Because µ and σ are locally Lipschitz, for any given (ν, ξ) ∈ S × S equation (2.1) has a unique strong solution (Theorem V.7 in [37] and the text after its proof).
To account for the dependence of X on its initial position, from now on we shall write X x,ν,ξ where appropriate. In the rest of the paper we use the notation
, for f Borel-measurable, since ( X, ν, ξ) is Markovian but the initial value of the controls is always zero. Here E x is the expectation under the measure P x ( · ) := P( · | X 0 = x) on (Ω, F). As mentioned in the introduction, (2.1) will be the underlying process in the game of control.
To keep the notation simple and avoid introducing another filtered probability space, we also assume that the filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, P) is sufficiently rich to allow for the treble (Ω, F, P), F, (X, W ) to be a weak solution to the SDE
where W is another Brownian motion. Notice that this requirement does not affect generality of our results because X and X never feature at the same time in our optimisation problems.
In particular X will appear only in the game of stopping. Assumption 2.1 guarantees that the above SDE admits a weak solution which is unique in law up to a possible explosion time [30, Ch. 5.5] . Indeed for every x ∈ I there exists ε o > 0 such that
To account explicitly for the initial condition, we denote by X x the solution to (2.5) starting from x ∈ I at time zero. Due to (2.6) the diffusion X is regular in I; that is, if τ z := inf{t ≥ 0 : X x t = z} one has P(τ z < ∞) > 0 for every x and z in I so that the state space cannot be decomposed into smaller sets from which X cannot exit (see [9, Ch. 2] ).
We make the following standing assumption.
Assumption 2.2. The points x and x are either natural or entrance-not-exit for the diffusion X, hence unattainable. Moreover, x and x are unattainable for the uncontrolled process X 0,0 .
For boundary behaviours of diffusions one may consult p. 15 in [9] . Unattainability of x and x refers to the fact that, for x ∈ I, the processes X x and X x,0,0 cannot leave the interval (x, x) in finite time, P-a.s. Feller's test for explosion (see, e.g., Theorem 5.5.29 in [30] ) provides necessary and sufficient conditions under which x and x are unattainable for the diffusions X and X 0,0 . Moreover, specific properties of natural and entrance-not-exit boundaries may be addressed by using the speed measure m(dx) and the scale function S(x) of the above diffusions (since we are not going to make use of these concepts we simply refer the interested reader to pp. 14-15 in [9] for details).
In the next remark we show that if σ ′ is sufficient integrable, then unattainable boundary points of X are also unattainable for the uncontrolled process X 0,0 . Remark 2.3. For simplicity let us assume that σ ∈ C 2 (I) so that both (2.1) and (2.5) admit strong solution. For x ∈ I let us define a new measure Q x by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
which is an exponential martingale under suitable integrability conditions on σ ′ . Hence Girsanov theorem implies that the process
s )ds is a standard Brownian motion under Q x and it is not hard to verify that Law ( X 0,0 Q x ) = Law (X P x ).
It follows that denoting σ 0
Notice also that the measures Q x and P x are equivalent on F W t for all 0 ≤ t < +∞, where (F W t ) t≥0 is the filtration generated by W (see [30] , Chapter 3.5). In particular {σ 0 I ≤ t} ∈ F W t . Therefore, using that x and x are unattainable for X, we get
I < +∞) = 0 which proves that x and x are unattainable for the process X 0,0 under P x for all x ∈ I.
The infinitesimal generator of the uncontrolled diffusion X x,0,0 is denoted by L X and is defined as
whereas the one for X is denoted by L X and is defined as
Letting r > 0 be a fixed constant, we assume
We denote by ψ and φ the fundamental solutions of the ODE (see [9, Ch. 2, Sec. 10])
and we recall that they are strictly increasing and decreasing, respectively. Finally, we denote by S ′ (x), x ∈ I, the density of the scale function of (X t ) t≥0 , and by w the Wronskian 
For future frequent use we also recall the one-sided version of the above result.
Lemma 2.6. Let Assumption 2.1 hold. For any a ∈ I, x ≥ a and ξ ∈ S there exists a unique ν a ∈ S that solves the Skorokhod reflection problem SP ξ a+ (x) defined by
Similarly, for any b ∈ I, x ≤ b and ν ∈ S there exists a unique ξ b ∈ S that solves the Skorokhod reflection problem SP
The proof of the above lemma is based on a Picard iteration scheme. Although this derivation seems to be standard we could not find a precise reference for our particular setting, and we provide a short proof in Appendix A.2.
The game of controls
We introduce a 2-player nonzero-sum game of singular control, where player 1 (resp. player 2) can influence the dynamics (2.1) by exerting the control ν (resp. ξ). The game has the following structure: if player 1 uses a unit of control at time t > 0, she must pay a cost G 1 ( X ν,ξ t ), while player 2 receives a reward L 2 ( X ν,ξ t ). A symmetric situation occurs if player 2 exerts control. Both players want to maximise their own expected discounted reward functional Ψ i defined by 12) where r > 0 is the discount rate and the integrals are defined below.
To avoid dealing with controls producing infinite payoffs, we restrict our attention to the couples (ν, ξ) ∈ S × S for which
13)
We denote the space of such couples by
A definition of the integrals with respect to the controls in presence of state dependent costs requires some attention because simultaneous jumps of ξ and ν may be difficult to handle. An extended discussion on this matter is provided in Appendix A.1. Here we consider the class of admissible strategies (see Remark 2.9 below)
Following [43] (see also [32, 33] among others) we define the discounted costs of controls by
for T > 0, (ν, ξ) ∈ M, and for any function g such that the integrals are well defined. Throughout the paper we take functions G i and L i satisfying
Moreover the following asymptotic behaviours hold
Nash equilibria for the game are defined in the following way.
Definition 2.8. For x ∈ I we say that a couple (ν * , ξ * ) ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
and
We also say that V i (x) := Ψ i (x; ν * , ξ * ) is the value of the game for the i-th player relative to the equilibrium.
Remark 2.9. In several problems of interest for applications, the functionals (2.11) and (2.12) may be rewritten as the sum of three terms: an integral in time of a state dependent running profit, plus two integrals with respect to the controls, with constant instantaneous costs (see, e.g., [13] , [21] and [35] for similar functionals in the case of single agent optimisation problems). In such cases, the condition in (2.15) relative to jumps of the admissible strategies is not needed. In fact, we show in Appendix A.1 that if at least one player picks a control that reflects the process at a fixed boundary (i.e. solving one of the problems in Lemma 2.6), then the other player has no incentives in picking strategies outside of the class M.
Remark 2.10. It is worth noticing that, given a, b ∈ I with a < b, the couple of controls (ν a , ξ b ) which solves SP(a, b; x) belongs to M. In fact, one can easily check that (ν a , ξ b ) satisfy (2.13) and (2.14), for example by looking at the proof of Lemma 2.1 in [38] . Moreover, by construction we have P x (∆ν a t · ∆ξ b t > 0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Remark 2.11. Nash equilibria could in principle exist in broader sets than M. However this fact does not per se add useful information. In fact, unless some additional optimality criterion is introduced (for example maximisation of the total profit of the two players), it is often impossible to rank multiple equilibria according to the players' individual preferences. In this paper we content ourselves with equilibria in M, as these lead to explicit solutions and to the desired connection between OS and SSC.
The game of stopping
In this section we introduce a 2-player nonzero-sum game of stopping where the underlying process is X x as in (2.5). This is the game which we show is linked to the game of controls introduced in the previous section.
Denote by T the set of F-stopping times. The i-th player chooses τ i ∈ T with the aim of minimising an expected cost functional J i (τ 1 , τ 2 ; x), and the game ends at τ 1 ∧ τ 2 . This game has payoffs of immediate stopping given by the functions G i and L i appearing in the functionals (2.11) and (2.12) of the game of control. More precisely we set
As in the case of the game of controls, also here we introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.12. For x ∈ I we say that a couple (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) ∈ T × T is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
(2.21)
is the value of the game for the i-th player relative to the equilibrium.
Our choice for the game of stopping is motivated by an heuristic argument which is well known in the economic literature on irreversible (partially reversible) investment problems. We briefly illustrate the main ideas below.
In our game of controls, both players are faced with the question of how to use their control in order to maximise an expected payoff. This might be interpreted as the problem of two investors who must decide how to invest a unit of capital in order to maximise their future expected profits. In mathematical economics literature (see, e.g., [17] ) the question is known to be equivalent to the one of timing the investment of one unit of capital. The equivalence can be formally explained via an analysis of marginal costs and benefits for each investor.
Here we take the point of view of player 1, but symmetric arguments can be applied to player 2. Given an investment strategy ν, player 1 pays a marginal cost equal to G 1 per unit of investment. However, the upward shift in the controlled dynamics (due to ν) modifies the current level of the state variable, and therefore also the player's expected future profit. Such a change in the expected future payoffs, per unit of invested capital, represents the marginal benefit for player 1. As long as the marginal benefit is smaller than the marginal cost, then player 1 should wait and do nothing. On the contrary, at times when the marginal benefit equals or exceeds the marginal cost, it is clear that player 1 should invest (at the optimum the marginal benefit is never strictly larger than the marginal cost). In this sense, player 1 is timing the decision to incur a (marginal) cost G 1 , in exchange for expected future profits. This explains the (random) payoff G 1 (X τ 1 ) in (2.19)-(2.20), while the indicator 1 {τ 1 <τ 2 } is due to the fact that the previous argument holds until the second player decides to invest. In particular, while player 1 waits for her optimal time τ 1 to invest, it may happen that player 2 decides to invest first. This situation produces a marginal cost for player 1 equal to L 1 (which here may be negative or positive), and explains the role of the (random) payoff
Since investors try to minimise costs, we are naturally led to consider minimisation of the players' expected discounted marginal costs (2.19)-(2.20). The specific discount factor adopted here is due to the nature of the underlying controlled diffusion, and it is a technical point which will become clear in the analysis below.
The main result
Here we prove the key result of the paper (Theorem 3.1), i.e. a differential link between the value functions v i , i = 1, 2 relative to Nash equilibria in the game of stopping and the value functions V i , i = 1, 2 relative to Nash equilibria in the game of control. The result holds when the equilibrium stopping times for X are hitting times to suitable thresholds so that the related optimally controlled X is reflected at such thresholds.
Theorem 3.1 relies on assumptions regarding the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping and suitable properties of the associated values v 1 and v 2 . It was shown in [16] that such requirements hold in a broad class of examples, and we will summarise results of [16] in Proposition 3.5 below, for completeness.
For a given connected set O ⊆ I, in the theorem below we will make use of the Sobolev space W 2,∞ loc (O). This is the space of functions which are twice differentiable in the weak sense on O, and whose weak derivatives up to order two are functions in L ∞ loc (O). We will also use that if u ∈ W (a) The stopping times
form a Nash equilibrium for the game of stopping as in Definition 2.12;
Moreover they solve the boundary value problem
Then, the strategy profile that prescribes to reflect X at the two barriers a * and b * (up to a possible initial jump) forms a Nash equilibrium for the game of control (cf. Definition 2.8). In particular, for x ∈ I and t ≥ 0, such an equilibrium is realised by the couple of controls 6) where (ν a * , ξ b * ) uniquely solves Problem SP(a * , b * ; (x ∨ a * ) ∧ b * ). Finally, the value functions V i (x) = Ψ i (x; ν * , ξ * ), i = 1, 2 are given by
with
Proof. The proof is by direct check and it is performed in two steps.
Step 1. The functions
with κ 1 and κ 2 as in (3.9), are C 1 on I (by continuity of G i and L i on I) with
. We now show that u 1 , u 2 and the boundaries a * , b * solve the system of coupled variational problems
(3.13)
We will only give details about the derivation of (3.13) as the ones for (3.12) are analogous. The last three properties in (3.13) follow by observing that u ′ 2 = −v 2 , and by using
, and (3.5) (cf. (c) in the statement of the theorem). To prove the first equation in (3.13) we use the definition of u 2 (see (3.11) ) and explicit calculations to get
Then we also use (3.2) to obtain that, for x ∈ (a * , b * ),
Integrating by parts the right hand-side of (3.15), using
, and substituting the result back into (3.14), the right-hand side of (3.14) equals zero upon recalling the definition of κ 2 (see (3.9)). Finally, to prove the second line in (3.13) it is enough to notice that for
by (3.4) and then argue as before.
Step 2. We now proceed to a verification argument to show that u i = V i , i = 1, 2, and that the strategy profile (3.6) forms a Nash equilibrium. We provide again full details only for u 2 as the proof follows in the same way for u 1 .
Recall the dynamics for X ν,ξ from (2.1), and notice that by definition (3.6), the couple of controls (ν * , ξ * ) solves the Skorokhod reflection problem in [a * , b * ], up to an initial jump. Moreover, Remark 2.10 guarantees that (ν * , ξ * ) ∈ M.
First we show that u 2 ≥ Ψ 2 (x; ν * , ξ) for any admissible ξ. Take ξ ∈ S • such that (ν * , ξ) ∈ M. It is important to notice that ν * in (3.6) involves the control ν a * that solves SP ξ a * + (x ∨ a * ) of Lemma 2.6, for an arbitrary ξ. Recalling that that u 2 ∈ C 2 (a * , x), we can apply Itô-Meyer's formula, up to a localising sequence of stopping times, to the process u 2 ( X x,ν * ,ξ ) (in particular we use that P x (∆ν * t · ∆ξ t > 0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0). The integral with respect to the continuous part of the bounded variation process ν * − ξ is the difference of the integrals with respect to dν * ,c and dξ c . For x ∈ I we obtain
where M is 18) and θ y is the stopping time
Notice that for any t ∈ (0, θ y ] we have a * ≤ X x,ν * ,ξ t ≤ X x,ν * ,0 t ≤ y, hence continuity of σ and of u ′ 2 imply that (M t ) t≤θy is a martingale. Since (ν * , ξ) ∈ M, the process X x,ν * ,ξ is left-continuous and we have
where
Hence (3.17) may be written in a more compact form as (cf. (2.16), (2.17))
Now, we notice that the third and fifth formulae in (3.13) imply that u ′ 2 ≥ −G 2 on I and that
) for all s in the support of dν * s (i.e. for all s ≥ 0 s.t. X
x,ν * ,ξ s ≤ a * ). Moreover, employing the second expression in (3.13) jointly with the fact that X x,ν * ,ξ s ≥ a * for s > 0, we get
By taking expectations we end up with
We aim at taking limits as y → x in (3.23), and we preliminarily notice that θ y ↑ σ I as y → x, P x -a.s. (ii) Recall the integrability conditions (2.13) and (2.14) in the definition of M. Then, using that θ y ↑ σ I as y ↑ ∞, and applying the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
Finally, we combine items (i) and (ii) and take limits in (3.23) as y → x to get
Hence u 2 (x) ≥ Ψ 2 (x; ν * , ξ) for any ξ ∈ S such that (ν * , ξ) ∈ M. Now, repeating the steps above with ξ = ξ * , the inequalities in (3.22) and (3.23) become strict equalities due to the fact that X
Moreover the process u 2 ( X ν * ,ξ * ) is bounded, so that passing to the limit as y → x gives lim y↑x E x e −rθy u 2 ( X ν * ,ξ * θy ) = 0 by dominated convergence and Assumption 2.2. Hence u 2 (x) = Ψ(x; ν * , ξ * ) = V 2 (x).
Remark 3.2. From the game-theoretic point of view, Nash equilibria of Theorem 3.1 above are Markov perfect [34] (also called Nash equilibria in closed-loop strategies), i.e. equilibria in which players' actions only depend on the "payoff-relevant" state variable X. Our result provides a simple construction of closed-loop Nash equilibria for specific continuous time stochastic games of singular control. Since this problem is yet to be solved in game theory in its full generality (see the discussion in Section 2 of [2] and in [39] ), our work contributes to fill this gap.
On the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.
In this section we give sufficient conditions under which a * and b * as in Theorem 3.1 exist. Moreover, in Remark 3.6 we provide algebraic equations for a * and b * which can be solved at least numerically. Recall φ and ψ, i.e. the fundamental decreasing and increasing solutions to (2.9), and recall that r > µ ′ (x) for x ∈ I by Asssumption 2.4. We need the following set of functions: and
for all x ∈ I, and with h(x) := (L X H − (r − µ ′ )H)(x). We denote by A 1 (respectively A 2 ) the set of all H ∈ A such that h is strictly positive (resp. negative) on (x, x h ) and strictly negative (resp. positive) on (x h , x), for some x h ∈ I with lim inf x→x h(x) > 0 (resp. lim sup x→x h(x) < 0) and lim sup x→x h(x) < 0 (resp. lim inf x→x h(x) > 0).
We also need the following assumption, which will hold in the rest of this section.
Moreover, lettingx 1 andx 2 in I be such that
32)
we assumex 1 <x 2 .
The above conditionx 1 <x 2 implies that, for any value of the process X, at least one player has a running benefit from waiting (see the introduction of [16] ).
The proof of the next proposition is given in Appendix A.2. In its statement we denote
with w > 0 as in (2.10). We also remark that the proposition holds under all the standing assumptions made so far in the paper (i.e. Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.7 and 3.4). For the reader's convenience we also recall that x and x are natural for X if the process cannot start from x and x and, moreover, when started in (x, x) cannot reach x or x in finite time. On the other hand, x is entrance-not-exit if the process can be started from x, but if started from x > x it cannot reach x in finite time. We refer to pp. 14-15 in [9] for further details. 1. x and x are natural boundaries for (X t ) t≥0 .
2. x is an entrance-not-exit boundary and x is a natural boundary for (X t ) t≥0 ; moreover the following hold
Remark 3.6. An important byproduct of our connection between nonzero-sum games of control and nonzero-sum games of stopping is that the equilibrium thresholds a * and b * of Theorem 3.1 are a solution to a system of algebraic equations which can be computed at least numerically. In the terminology of singular control theory, these equations correspond to the smooth-fit conditions
, and were obtained via a geometric constructive approach in [16] (see Theorem 3.2 therein). We recall the system here for completeness 
A game of pollution control
In order to understand the nature of our Assumptions 2.7 and 3.4, and illustrate an application of our results, we present here a game version of a pollution control problem. A social planner wants to keep the level of pollution low while the productive sector of the economy (modeled as a single representative firm) wants to increase the production capacity. If we assume that the pollution level is proportional to the firm's production capacity (see for example [25, 42] ), then the problem translates into a game of capacity expansion. Indeed, the representative firm aims at maximising profits by investing to increase the production level, whereas the social planner aims at keeping the pollution level under control through environmental regulations which effectively cap the maximum production rate.
For the production capacity we consider a controlled geometric Brownian motion as in [12, 13, 21] , amongst others,
for someμ ∈ R andσ > 0. The firm has running operating profit π(x), which is C 1 and strictly concave, and a positive cost per unit of investment α 1 (x). The social planner has an instantaneous utility function u(x) which is C 1 , decreasing and strictly concave 2 . Since imposing a reduction of production might also have some negative impact on social welfare (e.g., it might cause an increase in the level of unemployment), we introduce a positive 'cost' (in terms of the expected total utility) associated to the social planner's policies and we denote it by α 2 (x). For simplicity here we assume α i (x) ≡ α i > 0, i = 1, 2, and the objective functionals for the firm, denoted by Ψ 1 , and the social planner, denoted by Ψ 2 , are given by
Both players want to maximise their respective functional by picking admissible strategies from M. As explained in Lemma A.1 below, in this context there is no loss of generality for our scopes in considering M rather than
The game with functionals (4.2)-(4.3) will be tackled directly with the same methods developed in the previous sections. Indeed, the additional running cost terms require only a minor tweak to our method. Motivated by the analysis of the previous sections we look at the game of stopping where two players want to minimise the cost functionals below:
where the underlying process solves
Theorem 3.1 holds in this setting and links the game of control (4.2)-(4.3) to the game of stopping (4.4)-(4.5). In particular, in the statement of Theorem 3.1 we should now refer to the games in (4.2)-(4.5) and replace (3.2)-(3.5) by
Moreover, the constants κ i are adjusted as follows
Everything else remains the same, including the proof of the theorem, which can be repeated by following the exact same steps. We would like now to discuss sufficient conditions under which the game of stopping (4.4)-(4.5) admits a Nash equilibrium. In order to refer directly to the results for the stopping game from Section 3.1 it is convenient to rewrite (4.4)-(4.5) in the form of (2.19)-(2.20).
Here I = R + because X is a geometric Brownian motion. For r >μ we define functions Π ′ and U ′ via the ODEs 12) and by imposing growth conditions at zero and infinity. In particular, letting τ n := inf{t ≥ 0 :
A specific choice for π and u is discussed below, and for now we observe that by Dynkin formula and (4.12) we get
Letting n → ∞ in the above expressions, using (4.13) and plugging the result back in (4.4)-(4.5) we obtain the original formulation for J 1 and J 2 (cf. (2.19)-(2.20)) by setting
It only remains to verify that it is possible to choose π and u such that Assumption 3.4 and condition (4.13) hold. Hence, we can apply Proposition 3.5. We now set
and we notice that ζ 1 is decreasing by concavity of π whereas ζ 2 is increasing by concavity of u. For instance assuming Inada conditions
we have that (3.31) and (3.32) hold for somex i , i = 1, 2, which depend on the specific choice of π and u.
Let us now consider the case of π(x) = x λ and u(x) = −x δ where λ ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 1. For r > µ and sufficiently large we can guarantee (3.29) and (4.13). Moreover, denoting by γ 1 (resp. γ 2 ) the positive (resp. negative) root of the second order equation 2 γ(γ−1)+(μ+σ 2 )γ−(r−μ) = 0, conditions (3.28) on G 1 and G 2 are satisfied if λ > max{0, γ 2 + 1} and 1 < δ < 1 + γ 1 . Clearly (3.30) holds by the same arguments. Finally, we havê
so that a suitable choice of α 1 and α 2 ensures thatx 1 <x 2 .
A Appendix
A.1 Cost integrals and the set of strategies M
It is well known in the singular stochastic control literature that state dependent instantaneous costs of control give rise to questions concerning the definition of integrals representing the cumulative cost of exercising control. Zhu in [43] provided a definition consistent with the classical verification argument used in SSC for the solution to an HJB equation derived by the Dynamic Programming Principle. This definition has been adopted in several other papers concerning explicit solutions of SSC problems (see [32, 33] among others), and this is also the one that we use in our (2.16) and (2.17). Another, perhaps more natural, possibility is instead to define the integral as a Riemann-Stieltjes' integral as for example it was done by Alvarez in [1] .
Despite this formal difference, it is remarkable that the two definitions for the cost of exercising control lead essentially to the same optimal strategies for problems of monotone follower type. In particular, it is possible to obtain Zhu's integral from the Riemann-Stieltjes' one by taking the limit as n → ∞ of a sequence of controls that, at a given time t, make n instantaneous jumps of length h/n for a fixed h > 0. The optimality of this behaviour is illustrated for example by Alvarez in Corollary 1 of [1] , and it is often referred to as "chattering policy". The inconvenience with this approach is that the control obtained in the limit is not admissible in our S, and therefore optimisers can only be obtained in a larger class.
Zhu's integral has proved to work very well in problems with monotone controls (representing for instance irreversible investments) or with controls of bounded variation (representing for instance partially reversible investment policies). In particular, the latter are often chosen in such a way that the controller's decision to invest/disinvest reflects the minimal decomposition of the control process (cf. [13] , [19] and [23] , among others). In other words, investment and disinvestment do not occur at the same time, and this assumption is often justified by conditions on the absence of arbitrage opportunities.
Here instead we have agents who use their controls independently, and it is unclear why a priori they should decide not to contrast each other's moves by acting simultaneously. To elaborate more on this point and understand our choice of the set M, it is convenient to look at particular cases of our problem.
In some instances, it is interesting to include in our functionals (2.11) and (2.12) a statedependent running cost π i and use constant marginal costs/rewards of control α i , β i (see our example in Section 4 or problems studied in [13] , [21] or [35] ). The corresponding functionals read as follows
In these cases the integrals with respect to the controls are simply understood as a RiemannStieltjes' integrals. For α i < β i we prove that, if one of the two players opts for a control that reflects the process at a threshold, then the other player's best response avoids simultaneous jumps of the controls. The condition α i < β i is the analogue in this context of the absence of arbitrage in papers like [13] , [21] and [35] . The result is illustrated in the next lemma.
Lemma A.1. Consider the game with functionals (A-1)-(A-2). Let a, b ∈ I, recall Lemma 2.6 and assume α i < β i , i = 1, 2. If player 1 (resp. player 2) chooses
Proof. Let x, a ∈ I and ξ ∈ S • (recall (2.13)-(2.14)) and consider ν a solving SP ξ a+ (x ∨ a). We want to perform a pathwise comparison of the cost functional for player 2 under two different controls. In particular, we fix ω ∈ Ω and assume that there exists (a stopping time) t 0 = t 0 (ω) > 0 such that ∆ν a t 0 · ∆ξ t 0 (ω) > 0. With no loss of generality we may assume that X
x,ν a ,ξ t 0
(ω) > a and that the downward jump ∆ξ t 0 is trying to push the process below a, i.e.
This push causes the immediate reaction of the controlν a and therefore a simultaneous jump of the two controls. The case in which X
(ω) ≤ a can be dealt with in the same way up to trivial changes.
We denote by ξ 0 a control in S • such that
In particular, ξ 0 (ω) is the same as ξ(ω) but the jump size at t 0 (ω) is reduced so that the process is not pushed below a. For ν a solving SP ξ 0
a+ (x ∨ a) the jump at t 0 is not triggered. Therefore, X x,ν a ,ξ 0 t 0 + (ω) = a due only to the downward push given by ξ 0 . Now we observe that the (random) Borel measure dν a , induced byν a in response to ξ, differs from the measure dν a , induced bỹ ν a in response to ξ 0 , only for a mass at t 0 (which is needed to compensate for the jump of ξ).
(ω) = a and nothing else has changed for t = t 0 . It is now easy to see that the couple (ν a , ξ) requires an additional cost for player 2 compared to the couple (ν a , ξ 0 ) and therefore cannot be optimal. For the sake of clarity here we denote by ν a,ξ the solution to SP ξ a+ (x ∨ a) and by ν a,ξ 0 the solution to SP ξ 0 a+ (x ∨ a), and also we set ν a,ξ andν a,ξ 0 as in (A-3).
So we obtain
and the last term is negative as α 2 < β 2 and by (A-4). Since the above argument can be repeated for any simultaneous jump ofν a and ξ, and any ω ∈ Ω, the proof is complete.
The point of the above lemma is that if costs of control are constant then a simple condition for the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that if one player picks a reflecting strategy then the other one will pick a control such that (ν, ξ) ∈ M. Therefore, under such assumptions, the equilibria constructed in Theorem 3.1 are also equilibria in the larger class S • × S • .
A.2 Auxiliary results
We recall here the fundamental solutions φ and ψ of (2.9), and recall also that x and x are unattainable for X of (2.5) and for the uncontrolled diffusion X 0,0 of (2.1) (cf. Assumption 2.2).
Lemma A.2. Let a * ∈ I be arbitrary but fixed. Take
with ν a * solving the Skorokhod reflection problem SP 0 a * + (x ∨ a * ) of Lemma 2.6. For y ∈ (a * , x), set θ y := inf{t > 0 : X ν * ,0 t ≥ y} and q(x, y) := E x e −rθy , x ∈ I.
Then for i = 1, 2 we have
Similarly let b * ∈ I be arbitrary but fixed. Take
with ξ b * solution to the Skorokhod reflection problem SP We notice that X x,ν * ,0 t = X x∨a * ,ν a * ,0 t , t > 0, and therefore θ y is equal toθ y := inf{t > 0 : X x∨a * ,ν a * ,0 t ≥ y} and q(x, y) = q(a * , y) for x ≤ a * . Functionals involvingθ y have well known analytical properties, and from now on we will make no distinction between θ y andθ y .
For x ≥ y one has q(x, y) = 1, whereas it is shown in Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 of [38] that the function q( · , y) solves
with boundary conditions q(y−, y) := lim x↑y q(x, y) = 1, q x (a * +, y) := lim x↓a * q x (x, y) = 0.
In particular we refer to the condition at a * as the reflecting boundary condition. Since q( · , y) solves (A-7) then it may be written as
We aim at showing that α > 0 and we can do it by considering separately two cases.
Case 1. Assume γ < 0. Since the second term in (A-13) can be made arbitrarily small by letting y → x then it must be α > γ ψ ′ (a * )/ φ ′ (a * ) > 0.
Case 2. Assume γ = 0. If α = 0 then the first term on the left-hand side of (A-13) is zero and by using (A-11) and (A-12) we get from (A-13)
hence a contradiction. So it must be α > 0.
Finally, for fixed x ∈ (x, y), there exists a constant C = C(a * , x) > 0 such that (A-8) and (A-9) give 0 ≤ q(x, y) 1 + Now letting y → x we have ψ(y) → ∞ as x is unattainable for X 0,0 . We have two possibilities:
(a) Proof of Lemma 2.6. We provide here a short proof of the existence of a unique solution to the Skorokhod reflection problem SP ξ a+ (x). Notice that the drift and diffusion coefficients in the dynamics (2.1) are locally Lipschitzcontinuous due to our Assumption 2.1. So we first prove the result for Lipschitz coefficients, and then extend it to locally Lipschitz ones. Notice that here we are not assuming sublinear growth of µ and σ but we rely on non attainability of x and x for the uncontrolled process X 0,0 . Existence of a unique solution to problem SP ν b− (x) can be shown by analogous arguments. For simplicity, from now on we just write SP ξ a+ and omit the dependence on x.
Step 1 -Lipschitz coefficients. Here we assume µ, σ ∈ Lip(I) with constant smaller than L > 0. Let a ∈ I, x ≥ a and ξ ∈ S, and consider the sequence of processes defined recursively by X with R 1 := R 1 (x, a, L) > 0. Thanks to (A-17) and (A-18) we can now proceed with an argument often used in SDE theory for the proof of existence of strong solutions (see, e.g., the proof of [30, Ch. 5, Thm. 2.9]). That is, we use Chebyshev inequality and Borel-Cantelli's lemma to find that (X [k+1] , ν [k+1] ) k≥0 converges a.s., locally uniformly in time, as k ↑ ∞. We denote this limit by ( X ν a ,ξ , ν a ) . By Lipschitz continuity of µ and σ and the same arguments as above we also obtain that the sequences ( Step 2 -locally Lipschitz coefficients. Here we assume µ and σ as in Assumption 2.1. Let x n ↑ x and define µ n (x) = µ(x)1 {x≤xn} + µ(x n )1 {x>xn} , σ n (x) = σ(x)1 {x≤xn} + σ(x n )1 {x>xn} .
For each n we denote by SP ξ (n) a+ the Skorokhod problem SP ξ a+ but for the dynamics dX t = µ n (X t )dt + σ n (X t )dW t + dν t − dξ t rather than for (2.1).
Since for each n we have µ n and σ n uniformly Lipschitz on [a, x), then Step 1 guarantees that there exists a unique (X (n) , ν (n) ) that solves SP ξ (n) a+ . We denote τ n := inf{t > 0 : X (n) t ≥ x n } and for all t ≤ τ n we have Fix an arbitrary T > 0. For all ω ∈ {τ n > T } and all t ≤ T we can define ( X
